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Muslim Religious Education in China
Élisabeth Allès
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Michael Black
1 Despite  their  diversity,  China’s  Muslims1 have  been  engaged  for  twenty  years  in  a
process of reaffirmation of their religion and identity2: construction and renovation of
mosques, dissemination of information on Islam in the world, translation of religious
texts, etc3. As is the case in the rest of the Muslim world, their efforts have also been
aimed at the field of education. At first, in the early 1980s, education was restricted to
the mosque schools, but quickly, through individual or collective initiatives, both local
and provincial,  a  number of  private Arabic or Sino-Arabic schools,  as well  as many
institutes, have opened all over the country. During the surveys we carried out in 2000
and 2002 in the provinces of Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Henan, Yunnan and in Hainan,
we were able to observe the extraordinary growth of this Muslim teaching4.
2 Muslim religious leaders in China have always complained of their co-religionists’ lack
of  religious  knowledge:  the  flowering  of  schools  does  indeed  answer  a  desire  for
education but also corresponds to the need to maintain and keep alive the Muslim
religion among the faithful dispersed in the Chinese world, on whom twenty years of
repression5 of  all  public  religious  activity  have  left  their  mark.  Moreover,  in  the
framework of the policy of reforms carried out in the field of education6 for over ten
years  (decisions taken  in  1985  and  1993)  which  led  to  the  decentralisation  and
privatisation of education, the objective of these Muslim initiatives is to compensate
for the disengagement of the central state, and to make it possible for populations7 in
difficult economic situations, and particularly for girls, to receive a basic education.
Within the Chinese Muslim world, education and its modernisation are the objects of
debate, controversy and competition between religious movements. These debates are
not about the situation of the primary or secondary public schools, although it is a
difficult situation, for these schools remain on a very low level despite the efforts made,
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particularly  in  the  peripheral  regions  and  along  the  frontiers8.  According  to  Hui
researchers, the situation of Hui public schools, as with other schools, has deteriorated,
particularly  with  decentralisation.  One  of  them  gave  a  revealing  description  of  a
primary school in a Hui area of Xi’an, which does not seem to be the only one in this
situation: “In order to be able to meet the needs of the school, whose expenses have
increased considerably, the schoolyard has become a warehouse and a parking lot for
taxis and lorries, and the school toilets have been made into public toilets”. He also
noted the difficulties encountered in paying the salary supplements of teachers, and
lamented the fact that many of the pupils had to work after school: “It means that they
can open their  books only during classes”.  In 1997,  the school  lost  one-third of  its
pupils.9 But  since  the  public  schools  are  the  responsibility  of  the  central  and local
authorities and the local population has little influence on their decisions, discussions
tend to be about the private schools, over which the Muslims, having established them,
have real power.
3 A study of the current development of denominational schools makes it  possible to
measure the degree of autonomy available to Muslims and to observe the way in which
the political control of the state is exercised over this aspect of religious life nowadays.
In fact education, a politically sensitive issue, is an area where many players confront
each other, on a variety of levels.
4 In  the  Uygur  autonomous  region  of  Xinjiang,  the  authorities  in  Peking  decided  to
impose strict and systematic control over education in the areas of both religion and
language.  Religious  education,  which  had  become  widespread  with  the  return  of
religious activities in the 1980s, was once again forbidden in 1996 following the troubles
in the region (incidents in Khotan, Gulja, Bahren and Aksu). Since then there has
been a  slow recovery10.  In  2002  an Imam was  allowed to  teach only  one  or  two
students11, and only with the backing of the Bureau of Religious Affairs and of the
local  authorities,  whereas,  as  we  shall  see,  there  can  be  close  to  a  hundred
students in the mosque schools in other Chinese provinces. The rule which states
that  one  must  be  over  18  to  study  religion  is,  in  Xinjiang,  strictly  applied.
Moreover it is not legally possible to open a Muslim school like the ones in the rest
of the country. Only one Koranic Institute (jingxueyuan), managed and controlled
by the authorities, is authorised in Urumqi. Basic religious instruction is provided
in the Arabic language.  On the linguistic level,  in May 200212,  Peking provided a
reminder in the press of the decision—taken earlier but not yet really applied—to
eliminate the Uygur language from higher education13.  Moreover the poverty of
Uygur families, especially in the oases in southern Tianshan, makes it impossible
for their children to receive a normal education in public schools which have now
become  fee-paying,  even  for  the  theoretically  obligatory  first  nine  years  of
schooling. The result is that a Uygur child who does not come from an urban and
relatively prosperous background has very little chance of being able to avail of an
education beyond primary level, which he will usually have received in Uygur14. If
a  family  seeks  to  compensate  for  this  educational  deficiency  with  religious
schooling, they will have to wait until the child reaches the age of 18 and send him
either abroad, in this case to Pakistan, if they can afford it, or to have him follow
the course in a Koranic school in another part of China if they have been able to
establish  contact  with  the  school15.  The  organisation  of  clandestine  schools  is
indeed  possible,  but  the  risks  are  real.  Thus,  the  limited  opportunities  for
education  mean,  that  in  the  streets  of  the  cities,  as  in  Khotan  for  example,
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numbers  of  young boys  aged  between 12  and 14  work  as  drivers  of  ramshackle
taxi-carts  pulled  by  donkeys  in  order  to  contribute  to  their  families’  needs.
Moreover, even a young Uygur graduate of the University of Urumqi has but little
hope of professional employment in the region, as his low linguistic competence in
Chinese will prevent him obtaining a job, preference being given to Han Chinese
speakers. In these hopeless situations, it cannot come as any surprise that young
people  seek  to  leave  the  area  or  are  attracted  by  a  modern  discourse  which
preaches  the  unity  of  Islam and a  return to  the  Caliphate16.  A  number of  them,
suspected  of  belonging  to  the  Hizb  it-Tahrir17 (Liberation)  movement,  were
arrested18 in the spring of 2001 in Xinjiang19.
5 In the other Chinese provinces, the situation is very different, in as much as it is mainly
a case of Chinese-speaking Muslims (the Hui). The confrontation then takes place not
only with the central  state  but  more with the local  authorities.  Moreover religious
education reveals the rivalries between Muslim religious movements.
From mosque school to private school
6 There are about 40,00020 mosques in China, each of which, in theory, has a school 21.
However, not all the ahong (Imams)22 of these places of worship have students. Apart
from the authoritarian restrictions to be seen in Xinjiang,  this  can be due,  in non-
conflict  situations,  to  the  tiredness  and  advanced  age  of  the  ahong.  In  these
circumstances,  students  can  easily  join  another  school  nearby.  While  the  average
number of students can be estimated at twenty per mosque, some of them, which have
space,  better facilities  and where the teaching of  the ahong is  renowned,  can bring
together a hundred students. In theory at least 18 years old23, these students are mainly
boys, particularly in the provinces of the north-west. However the mosque schools are
also open to girls when there are no mosques for women24 as in the provinces of the
central plain. Some of the students have been to public school, up to the end of the
second secondary  syllabus  (gaozhong);  however  a  large  number  of  them stopped  at
primary school or at the end of the first secondary school syllabus (chuzhong) and some
are virtually illiterate in Chinese. They are natives of different regions and sometimes
come  from  very  far  away.  Tuition  fees  are  paid  for  by  the  host  community,  as  is
accommodation, if the student’s family is unable to find the money.
Some history
7 All through the history of Islam in China, as well as today, education has been a major
issue. It is a question of maintaining communities of the faithful in an environment
which is overwhelmingly non-Muslim. In the sixteenth century, schools were opened at
the mosques to provide religious education called jintang jiaoyu (teaching of the room of
the classics), characteristic of traditional Islam (laojiao)25, the content of which had been
elaborated by an ahong from Shaanxi, Hu Dengzhou (1522-1597)26, on his return from a
journey to Mecca. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the fundamentalist and
reformist movement ikhwan 27,  of Wahhabite inspiration, made the modernisation of
education one of its watchwords, insisting at the time on the learning of Chinese and
the education of women.
8 Other Muslim reformers involved in the intellectual ferment of the whole of Chinese
society at the beginning of the twentieth century set up schools, such as the famous
teacher’s training college, Chengda28, whose objective was to provide modern teaching
combining the  joint  study of  Chinese  and Arabic,  of  history,  mathematics,  and the
sciences, and to promote the sending of students abroad.
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9 The classic syllabus in traditional Islam (laojiao) called for over ten years of study, with
several ahong. The halifa 29 learned Arabic and Persian, the basic texts (the haiti 30, the
zaxue 31, the Koran, the sunna 32, the tafsir 33, the fiqh 34 ) and carried on35 with deepening
texts in both languages with an emphasis on Persian36, particularly in the case of Sufi
teaching and of that dispensed by the female ahong. It was a teaching based on the
master to disciple relationship, which favoured a deepening of the understanding of
the texts and a broadening of knowledge. This course ended, as it does today, with a
ceremony called “the taking of the vestment” (chuanyi)37 which marks the progression
from the rank of student to that of ahong.
The situation today
10 With the revival of religious activity, the need to rejuvenate the ahong, and the pressure
from  reformed  teaching,  the  form  and  content  of  the  classical  syllabus  have  been
modified.  The number of  years  of  study has  been reduced to  four  or  five,  and the
special relationship between master and disciple is tending to dissipate, because of the
sometimes rapid turnover among the ahong,  but above all because of the increasing
number of teachers. Where the content is concerned, teaching is limited to the learning
of Arabic and knowledge of the basic texts, supplemented by a course on the religious
policy of the state. Thus the modernisation of religious teaching takes into account one
of the main criticisms made of the ahong of traditional Islam, which was that they are
unable  to  express  themselves  in  Arabic,  and  pronounce  it  with  a  strong  Chinese
intonation. Arabic is  thus learned as a modern language and no longer simply as a
written language, the sacred language of the Koran. In order to display the good level
of Arabic of today’s young Chinese, competitions in reading the Koran are regularly
organised, at provincial and national levels,  in the presence of dignitaries from the
Muslim world. This improved language training is taking place at the expense of Farsi,
which, nevertheless,  still  remains a language of study in the teaching of the female
ahong and the Sufi brotherhoods. However, the texts required for the final examination
being mainly in Arabic, works in Persian are tackled less and less frequently. All in all,
while young students now have a real ability to speak Arabic, there is, on the other
hand, to the regret of many ahong, a reduction in religious knowledge. The academic
cycle ends with an examination supervised by the local Bureau of Religious Affairs, by a
representative of the local branch of the Islamic Association, if there is one, and by the
local  ahong. After  having  taken  the  vestment,  the  new  ahong is  invited  by  a  local
community to come and officiate. This reformed teaching has spread to all the mosques
in the last few years, whatever movement they belong to.
11 Since  the  1990s,  on  the  initiative  of  ahong or  of  lay  teachers, some of  the  mosque
schools,  while  remaining  on  the  premises  or  close  to  the  religious  building,  have
changed into independent organisations with the establishment of  a  director and a
specific administration38. Other schools are being built independently. They all have the
status of a private or specialised school (sili xuexiao, zhuanye xuexiao, or zhuanke xuexiao).
12  These private schools have acquired considerable importance. Some are known for the
numbers of their students, male and female, the diversity of their training, and the
possibility  they  offer  of  following  university  education  in  China  (in  the  foreign
language sections) or abroad. They often go by names such as “Sino-Arabic school”
(zhong a xuexiao), “Arabic language school” (ayu or alaboyu xuexiao), or “Muslim Culture
School”  (musilin  wenhua  xuexiao).  These  names  sometimes  convey  a  specific  option;
certain schools choose the name “Arabic School” in order to emphasise that their main
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objective is the teaching of the language; others add another component showing their
religious  commitment  such  as  Muguang  alaboyu  xuexiao (“Muslim  Light”  School  of
Arabic) or else an Arabic word: Xida zhong a xuexiao (Xidayah (The Right Path) Sino-
Arabic  School).  Others  emphasise  their  characteristic  identity:  Huizu  wenhua xuexiao
(School of Hui Culture). Those responsible for the Dali School have, deliberately, not
mentioned “Arabic School” or “Sino-Arabic”, but use the concept of Muslim culture:
Dali musilin wenhua zhuanke xuexiao (Dali Professional School of Muslim Culture). Indeed,
their  objective  is  not  to  restrict  themselves  to  language  learning,  but  to  give  the
students  as  wide an  awareness  as  possible  of  the  contemporary  world39.  These
designations show the tensions between what is specific to the Hui identity, what is
part of the Muslim identity, and the desire to put Arabic in the forefront, but we cannot
draw any general conclusions from this, for the choice of names depends not only on
the founder(s) of the school, but also on the local community, on its history and on the
circumstances of the moment.
13 It is difficult to have an exact idea of the number of these private schools in the whole
of  China.  There  are  said  to  be  twelve  schools  in  Yunnan  province40;  for  the  other
provinces, one can estimate that, where the number of Hui is relatively high41, there is
a minimum of five or six schools. If one is to believe some young Hui students of this
teaching,  five  schools  are  considered  the  most  prestigious:  one  in  Ningxia,  two  in
Henan, and two in Yunnan. The content of the teaching is now largely identical; the
differences lie in the facilities42, particularly in computers, and in the emphasis given to
certain classes. The subjects taught include: Arabic, using textbooks produced in Peking
or Shanghai;  a  more or less extensive basic religious education (Koran,  Sunna,  fiqh, 
tafsîr), for which the books come from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait; the history of China and
of Islam, with books published in Chinese and mostly written by Hui43. Lastly, there is a
course called social sciences, dealing with Chinese legislation and religious policy in
China.  Some  schools  offer  instruction  in  modern  and  classical  Chinese,  and  even
sometimes additional courses in English44 and computing. Studies are spread over four
years with a final examination which only a few succeed in passing. The schools are
often co-educational (but with separate classes)45; the students are aged between 18 and
2546, with girls making up more than half of those registered. They are accepted after
having passed the final secondary level examination (chuzhong or gaozhong) or reached
an equivalent level. The number of students averages a hundred and can reach three
hundred in the biggest schools. More than half come from the province in question, but
also from all over China, and although the majority are Muslims (Hui and Uygur), there
are also young Han, or, depending on the region, other minzu (Li, Yi, etc.) who convert
when their studies begin47. The study costs of the least wealthy are usually paid for48 by
the  host  community.  In  poor  areas,  costs  are  limited  to  200  yuan  for  four  years;
elsewhere  fees  average  400  to  500  yuan a  year,  to  which  must  be  added food  and
lodging costs of between 50 and 100 yuan per month. These modest fees are explained
by the financial involvement of the local communities and also by the low levels of
remuneration  given  to  teachers,  some  of  whom  are  retired  and  work  for  nothing.
Salaries are calculated according to a person’s family situation, geographical origins
and training. Which is to say that a man who is the head of a family, who comes from
another province from that of the school, and has studied abroad, will have the highest
salary. Payments are in the range of 300 to 500 yuan a month. While the majority of
teachers are men, about one-third are women. A noteworthy complementary activity is
the regular publishing of a newspaper written by the teachers with the participation of
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the students. These publications are widely distributed in the mosques and in the other
schools of each province and beyond; they are used to propagate theological ideas and
to provide information on social issues.
 “If we want to develop Islam, girls must be educated!”
14 The education of women, a preoccupation often spelt out by the ahong, is one of the
major components of current developments49. Thus, evening and sometimes morning
classes in the mosques, aimed at adult working or older women, bring together dozens
of people and sometimes more. These classes are given by ahong 50 of both sexes. An
example is  the evening school,  called the women’s school (nüxiao),  in Sanya on the
island of Hainan. This establishment consists of two main buildings, one being reserved
for the young girls who follow the regular teaching of one of the village’s mosques, the
other being made up of four classrooms. The quiet of the day yields, at nine o’clock, to
the buzz of comings and goings, and when the female ahong arrives, there rise the first
sounds of the collective recitation of the surats of the Koran, sung out loud, surats
which are repeated over and over in order to be remembered. There are about fifteen
people in each classroom. The same evening classes are to be found in the women’s
mosques in the Central Plain and also in the women’s mosque of Lanzhou (Gansu). A
complete plan of action designed to favour the education of girls has gradually been
put in place alongside the schools with regular courses.  For example,  instruction is
given one evening a week in specially provided classrooms, or during the holidays in
mosque schools, where one can see little girls of five or six learning the Arabic alphabet
in  chorus.  Even  more  remarkable  are  those  which,  with  few resources,  manage  to
maintain instruction aimed at adolescent girls.
15 Let us take the example of a girls’ school in Shuijinwan, a village in northern Yunnan,
near  Zhaotong.  This  very  poor  village  is  90%  Hui,  whose  resources  are  essentially
agricultural. It is a village where there has never really been any education for girls
despite the existence of a public school, to which families virtually only send boys51.
The situation has apparently grown worse with the advent of family planning. In 1982,
an ahong ikhwan 52, along with a woman teacher from another part of Yunnan, decided
to  found  a  school  for  young  girls  in  one  of  the  mosques.  This  immediately  had  a
hundred  students.  After  having  to  move  twice,  the  school  found  a  permanent
establishment  in  a  former  food  factory.  The  son  of  the  ahong took  over,  with  the
assistance of five young female teachers, and together they teach over 80 students aged
between 12 and 20. The school is considered to be a minban, and receives funds from the
local  community;  when  things  get  too  difficult  the  district  authorities  assign  it  a
subsidy of 1,000 yuan for the year. The young girls pay no tuition fees, their families are
too  poor,  the  only  costs  are  board  and  lodging  (20  yuan  per  month)  which  some
families  cannot  pay.  The  school  adds  up  to  30  yuan  per  pupil  per  month.  These
conditions mean, of course, that the buildings remain dilapidated, the dormitories with
floors of beaten earth are cleaned by the pupils, and the meals cooked by the older
ones. The teachers are paid a salary of 150 to 200 yuan a month. All the pupils are
boarders; they go home to their families only at weekends or on religious holidays.
When one sees the harshness of life around it, the school seems a haven of peace, and it
is without any doubt a protective place for girls. In principle, the pupils have attended
public  primary  school,  and  in  this  school  are  preparing  for  the  secondary  school
examinations (chuzhong and gaozhong), but because of infrequent attendance at primary
school a remedial class is provided for the youngest. The day begins with exercise in
the schoolyard and continues with teaching in Chinese (five hours a week) and the
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learning  of  Arabic  (eight  hours  a  week).  These  young  girls  also  receive  religious
instruction which is  increased in the third and fourth years.  Few pupils  manage to
continue their studies, but it is notable that in 2002 four of them were able to go to a
mosque school in Shandong.
16 For the young girls, the school is a way of getting out of their family environment. It is
quite common to hear pupils recount their progress — sometimes rapid, from a few
days  to  a  year—from  school  to  school:  they  stay  in  the  one  where  they  feel  most
comfortable. For others, it is a real source of hope. A young woman of 19, from a very
religious Hui family in Xinjiang, told us how she had been obliged to stop going to
primary school in order to help and support her sick mother. Her brothers and sisters
were able to pursue their  secondary studies normally,  while she alone remained at
home. When the family situation improved, she wanted to return to secondary studies,
but no longer could; one of the religious schools in Yunnan then gave her a way out.
The Koranic Institutes
17 In  parallel  with  private  initiatives,  the  state  has  founded  Koranic  Institutes
(yisilanjiao jingxueyuan) at provincial level, through the Department of Religious Affairs
and the Islamic Association of China.  Established between 1983 and 1987,  they now
number eight, all  over China, in the cities of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Yinchuan, Xining,
Kunming,  Peking53,  Urumqi and Zhengzhou.  They have university status54 and their
objective is to train ahong, teachers, and Arabic language translators. These Institutes
receive major funding55, and one can admire the enormous new buildings which admit
numbers  of  male  and  female  students  which  are  much  lower  than  in  the  mosque
schools or the private schools. The Zhengzhou Institute has only 90 students (47 male,
43 female). The students enter these Institutes at the end of the second secondary cycle
(gaozhong) after an examination. Until 2001, the length of studies was only three years,
but is now five. Fees are relatively high: even if a student can obtain a grant, they must
pay 1,600 yuan for tuition and 140 or 150 yuan a month for lodging. On the other hand
the monthly salary of teachers is around 1,200 yuan. In order to attract students, the
Institutes,  such as the one in Zhengzhou,  seek to diversify the syllabus by opening
specialised  courses  in  calligraphy,  for  example,  or  in  martial  arts.  A  considerable
number of Muslim parents do not particularly want to send their children there: on top
of the selection process for admission and the cost of studies, they are wary of the kind
of  religious  instruction  given,  since  this  is  entirely  controlled  by  the  political
authorities.
Religious education: a springboard for study abroad or for finding a job
18 Going abroad is an opening for these students who would have had no chance of being
able to do so in the framework of public education (their families not being wealthy
enough,  or  not  being able  to  get  into  the  best  schools).  When they  return,  having
acquired a better knowledge of Muslim societies56, they relay the debates under way in
the Muslim world: their approach to society and to the role of Muslims in the world, as
well as their behaviour, often depend on where they have studied57.
19 For those who have not been lucky enough to go abroad, the normal syllabus leads to
becoming an ahong; others become teachers or interpreters (in Canton and Shenzhen)
or  follow  a  university  course  at  the  Foreign  Languages  Department  of  Peking
University. The young women, for their part, teach in private schools or can find a job
in the kindergartens opened by local communities58. However, many Hui teachers and
leaders emphasise that there are now more than enough ahong,  and prefer to open
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other possibilities to the young. From this point of view, it  is  worth examining the
experience of the Dali School. Situated in a small village near the south gate of the city
the  “Specialised  School of  Muslim  Culture”  (musilin  wenhua  zhuanke  xuexiao)  was
founded  by  three  retirees,  two  former  high  school  teachers  and  a  former  school
director. Having returned to their village, they were upset at the irrelevance of classical
Koranic teaching to the needs of today and to changes in society. In 1991, they founded
a school in a part of the mosque (laojiao), despite the reservations of the old ahong. As
well modernised teaching, they decided to open a section entirely in Chinese in order
to prepare students for the final examination for the teacher training university of
Kunming  (shifan  daxue)59.  In  2002,  13  of  the  16  candidates  registered  passed  the
examination, which will make it possible for them to teach in a public establishment.
Education: a muffled battleground between religious movements
20 Islam in China, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, is not monolithic. It has been and
continues to be influenced by many movements. While in past centuries there were
struggles for influence between traditional Islam and the Sufis,  or between the Sufi
brotherhoods  themselves,  since  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  the
confrontation has widened out to one between a fundamentalist and a modernist Islam,
represented by the ikhwan,  and more recently to a more rigoristic movement called
salafi  (san  tai)60.  The  places  of  confrontation  are  traditionally  the  mosque,  and
sometimes the street, but education has always been one of its main battlegrounds.
Today, as in the past, the conflict can become very violent61; formerly disagreements
concerned  the  interpretation  of  the  Koran  and  religious  practices.  In  our  day,  the
debates have changed little, it is a question of returning to the purity of the origins, of
reforming  practices  which  have  been  overly  adapted  to  local  circumstances,  of
remaining faithful to the Koran and of advocating the unity of Islam. Education is thus
by nature the place where these movements are expressed. It is generally on his return
from a stay in the Holy Land that a man bearing a rejuvenated gospel introduces his
teaching into a mosque school. His charisma, his ability to persuade and train disciples
will be the driving force of the success of such a movement, as well, of course, as the
social and political situation into which he fits.  Consequently,  after twenty years of
religious activity, profound changes in Chinese society, the anxieties produced by social
inequality resulting from economic development, the lack of bearings of many young
people and the absence of any democratic political space, mean that a growing number
of young people are attracted to the discourse of the salafi movement on the unity of
Umma, and by the clarity and simplicity of its doctrine (a return to the faith of the
elders (salaf)62. While there is here an attempt to find a kind of social morality, some
ideals and a course of action for life—an attempt which is understandable after the
preceding years of political campaigns and today’s upheavals—, this rigoristic trend
produces  other  effects,  more  surprising  in  the  contemporary  Chinese  context,
particularly for women. One becomes aware of it63 at the sight of young girls being
educated in the schools of salafi inspiration, who are entirely veiled in black, with their
faces  covered.  This  is  a  singular  sight,  for  the  young girls  of  the  religious  schools
generally only wear a simple headscarf (hijâb) and sometimes long dresses.
Religious education under surveillance
21 The question of religious education has preoccupied the Chinese authorities since long
before September 11th. The increase in the number of schools, the growing numbers of
students returning from Muslim countries, the circulation of the writings of reformers
from the beginning of the century, which are now banned64, the situation in Xinjiang
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and also the activities of other movements such as those of the Christians and of the
Falungong, have prompted the authorities to increase surveillance. Thus on April 23rd
200165 they  established,  through  the  very  official  Islamic  Association  of  China,  a
“Committee  in  charge  of  Islamic  education  affairs”,  considered  to  be  a  specialised
commission  (zhuanmen)  at  national  level  and  made  up  of  16  members,  with  a  Hui
majority (10 out 16). The authorities have also provided themselves with an instrument
to regain the upper hand and try to control not only the teaching but also the content
of religious discourse: “Eliminating among the masses the false interpretations (wujie)
and confusion (hunluan) about religious matters”66. The first public initiative took place
in  Xinjiang in  August  2001  and was  devoted  to  the  presentation of  a  new book of
sermons  published by  the  Committee  in  July  and strongly  recommended67.  Sermon
competitions will be organised from now on, like those concerning the reading of the
Koran. This committee is also responsible for the publishing of translations and of the
textbooks for teaching. We have in fact been able to observe, in the private schools we
visited, a kind of standardisation through the widespread use of the same books on
language, history, etc. However the effectiveness of such methods is open to question,
particularly  in  Xinjiang  where  the  problem  has  never  been  of  a  religious  kind.  A
significant event recently provided evidence of this: after a very official concert during
which a poem exalting Uygur national sentiment was sung, a severe call to order68 was
addressed  to  the  Party  cadres  of  the region,  for  an  incident  which  manifestly  had
nothing to do with religion.
22 Thus while the Party is unable to exercise total control over the ideas in circulation,
delegating their surveillance to the Muslims themselves seems to be a guarantee of
restricting the growth of new movements. However, where the growth of the salafi is
concerned,  this  calculation  has  so  far  been  mistaken.  In  fact,  the  traditional
independence of  one mosque from another and the increasing autonomy of society
make control more difficult.  Consequently, between state intervention in matters of
religion  and  the  increasing  forms  of  autonomy,  there  is  an  unstable  balance,  the
duration of which is difficult to predict. Moreover, the exercise of this control will be
all the more complicated because the government will not always be able to use the
divisions of Islam among the various “nationalities”. There has been much emphasis on
the heterogeneousness of the situations of these “nationalities” and on the differences
which divide them on historical, linguistic and cultural levels. These differences are
indisputable and are visible to any observer; it is nevertheless true that not only are
there exchanges between these groups, but that similar movements of revitalisation
pass through them and transcend their boundaries.
NOTES
1. Islam in China today includes ten “nationalities” (minzu) containing about 18 million
people. These are partly the Turkish or Turko-mongol speaking communities (Uygur,
Kazakh, Kirghiz, Bao’an, Dongxiang, Tatar, Ouzbek, Salar) living in the provinces of the
Northwest of China (Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai), a small group of Farsi speakers,
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the Tadjik in Xinjiang, and partly a population of 9 million Chinese speaking Muslims,
the Hui, who are scattered all over China. From the religious standpoint Muslims in
China are Sunnis of the Hanefite rite. Only the Tadjik are Ismaeli Chiites.
2. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese. Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, Cambridge
and London, Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1991, (1996, 3rd
ed.); Françoise Aubin, “Chine”, in H. Chambert-Loir et C. Guillot, Le culte des saints dans le
monde musulman, Etudes Thématiques, No. 4, Paris, EFEO, 1995, pp. 367-388.; Elisabeth
Allès, Musulmans de Chine. Une anthropologie des Hui du Henan, Paris, EHESS, 2000. 
3. E. Allès, L. Chérif-Chebbi, C. H. Halfon, “L’islam chinois, unité et fragmentation”, in 
Archives des sciences sociales des religions, No. 115, 2001, pp. 26-28.
4. In the course of this research we were able to meet the authorities and the pupils of
the mosque schools in the towns and villages we visited, of fifteen private schools and
three Islamic institutes (jinxueyuan). The minban are village or collective schools under
contract with the local authorities.
5. The first closings of mosques took place in 1958. Religious activities as a whole did
not start again until after the beginning of the reforms undertaken by Deng Xiaoping in
1978.
6. See on this subject the special report “Education” in China Perspectives, No. 36, July–
August 2001.
7. Minority populations with nationality status (minzu) whose level of illiteracy is often
higher than the national average. See the graph giving a summary by region of
illiteracy among the non-Han populations. Thierry Pairault, 2001, “Formation initiale et
développement économique”, China Perspectives, No. 36, July–August 2001, fig. 1, p. 6
8. Gerard A. Postiglione ed., China’s National Minority Education. Culture, Schooling, and
Development, New York and London, Falmer Press, 1999. On the education of Muslims in
China, see especially in this volume the articles by Dru Gladney, “Making Muslims in
China: Education, Islamicization and Representation”, pp. 55-94, and Colin Mackerras,
“Religion and the Education of China’s Minorities”, pp. 23-54.
9. Ma Bin, “Guanyu Xi’an huifang jiaoyu xianzhuang de sikao” (Reflections on the
present situation of education in the Hui area of Xi’an), Huizu xuegan (Journal of Hui
Studies), No. 1, 2001, pp. 199-205.
10. In August 2002 we observed in the towns of southern Tianshan the opening of
mosques only during the hours of prayer, which made any teaching impossible. Only
the great mosque of Id kah in Kashgar remained open to the public for tourist visits.
11. We were able to observe one exception to this rule. The ahong of a Hui mosque in
Urumqi (Shaanxi mosque), which is the seat of the local Islamic association, has the
privilege of having about twenty students. This privilege, granted for political reasons,
poses a serious background problem of discrimination against other ahong, especially
the Uygur ones.
12. AFP, Hong Kong, May 28th 2002.
13. While science studies were already in Chinese, Uygur was still regularly used in the
other disciplines.
14. Each minzu uses its own language at primary school. The learning of Chinese
(putonghua) generally begins in the last year of primary school and continues during
secondary school at a rate of about three hours a week. 
15. It is not unusual to see young Uygur boys and girls in the mosque schools in the
provinces of central and southern China.
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16. To many Muslims an ideal model of the organisation of power, the Caliphate was
abolished by Mustapha Kemal in 1924.
17. This movement has been active in Central Asia since 1995. For its thinking, its
history and its organisation see Ahmed Rashid, Asie centrale, champ de guerres, (original
title: Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia), Paris, Autrement, 2002, pp. 106-123;
Olivier Roy, “Islamic Ferments and State Responses in Central Asia; Is there a Chinese
Card?”, in François Godement, La Chine et son Occident. China and its western Frontier,
Paris, Centre Asie, Ifri, 2002, p.151.
18. The Economist, March 30th 2002, p. 26.
19. On the general situation in Xinjiang, see the reports by Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch.
20. The Islamic Association of China in 1995 officially listed 33,300 mosques, including
23,000 in Xinjiang. These figures are approximate, and according to the sources cited
vary considerably, with observation in the field prompting higher estimates.
21. As well as the Koranic schools, there are martial arts schools in some mosques.
22. The term ahong (from the Persian akhund) is used in Chinese Islam for Imam.
23. Some schools have pupils as young as 16.
24. These women’s mosques are a particularity of Chinese Islam. Directed by women 
ahong, they have existed for several centuries, particularly in the Central Plain. See
Elisabeth Allès, 2000, Musulmans de Chine. Une anthropologie des Hui du Henan, Paris,
EHESS, chaps. XII-XIII; M. Jaschok, Shui Jingjun, The History of Women’s Mosques in Chinese
Islam: A Mosque of their Own, Richmond, Curzon Press, 2000.
25. Ancient teaching which corresponds to the term qadim (ancient) in Arabic or gedimu
in Chinese transliteration.
26. This teaching is described by Françoise Aubin in: “L’enseignement dans la Chine
islamique pré-communiste (du XVIe au milieu du XIXe siècle): entre affirmation
identitaire et modernisme”, in N. Grandin et M. Gaborieau éds., Madrasa, La transmission
du savoir dans le monde musulman, Paris, Arguments, 1997, pp. 374-375.
27. On this movement and its development in China, see J. Lipman, 1997, Familiar
Strangers: a History of Muslims in Northwest China, University of Washington Press,
Seattle-London, pp. 208-211.
28. Jinan Chengda shifan xuexiao. This school was created in 1925 in one of the mosques
in Jinan by Ma Songjing (one of the four great ahong in China in the Republican period).
In 1929, the school was transferred to the Dongsi Mosque in Peking. It was among the
first to send groups of students to the biggest university in the Muslim world, Al-Azhar
in Cairo.
29. From the Arabic khalifah (successor) used in China as a term for a student in
theology. The term generally used in Arabic for student is talib.
30. Excerpts from the surats of the Koran in Arabic, annotated in Chinese
transliteration, and translated.
31. A collection of the precepts relating to the ablutions and prayers of the day. It is
conceived like the haiti, in Chinese transliteration from the Arabic.
32. Deeds and sayings of the Prophet.
33. Exegesis of the Koran.
34. Islamic law. Includes the study of the four schools of law (Hanafite, Malakite,
Shafeite, Hanbalite).
35. The complete syllabus comprised 13 works.
36. The search for knowledge in Islam traditionally followed this slow path.
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37. Today this ceremony is a highpoint in the cohesion of the community. It brings
together not only the members of the local community and their ahong, but also the 
ahong of the mosque where the candidate comes from. For the occasion, the latter
wears a long green coat and an imposing white turban.
38. This structure had already been initiated in the 1920s, for example in the Chengda
School previously mentioned.
39. Interview, July 2002.
40. Jacqueline Armijo-Hussein, 1999, “Resurgence of Islamic Education in China”, ISIM
Newsletter, No. 4, p. 12.
41. The city of Yinchuan (Ningxia) alone has three Sino-Arabic schools open at present.
42. These schools generally began with very little equipment. The teaching materials
were sometimes merely notebooks assembled by the teacher. 
43. Some of the writers are retired teachers who devote most of their time to this
dissemination of knowledge. A compilation of their texts on the history of Islam and of
Islam in China was published in 2000, in a work entitled Musilin zhongdeng zhuanye
xuexiao hanyu jiaocai, which is used in most of the schools.
44. Even in a laojiao mosque in Henan, we observed an English class in which Arabic was
used as the language of translation.
45. Except in the Northwest (Ningxia, Gansu) where it is the schools which are
separate. 
46. In some schools the students can be up to 28 or 30 years old.
47. If one lives outside a major city, the difficulties in getting access to secondary or
university education are the same, regardless of nationality.
48. As an overall figure for the schools we visited, 10 to 20% of the students are
supported by the local community, but in certain regions, as in the north of Yunnan, 40
to 50% of the students need help.
49. Leila Cherif, “Ningxia, l’école au féminin”, Etudes Orientales, No. 13/14, 1994, pp.
156-162; Constance-Hélène Halfon, “Femme et musulmane à Lanzhou, au Gansu”, Etudes
Orientales, No. 13/14, 1994, pp. 151-155.
50. In the Yunnan, the term shimu is used for a woman ahong.
51. This situation is not unique. The same thing can be seen in Ningxia, for example.
52. The other ahong of the town also belong to this movement.
53. A Koranic Institute already existed in 1955 in the Niu Jie area. Zhou Xiefan and Sha
Qiuzhen, Yilisilanjiao zai Zhongguo (The Islamic Religion in China), Peking, Huawen
chubanshe, 2002, p. 201. The present Institute opened 1986.
54. Interview, in April 2002, with the directors of the Institute in Zhengzhou.
Presentation of the Zhengzhou Institute in Henan Musilin, April 15th 2002, p. 23.
55. The Institute in Yinchuan has been particularly well endowed, with a subsidy of 1
million yuan in 1986 as well as bank loan facilities. Via the Islamic Association of China,
funds also came from the World Islamic Development Bank.
56. Armo-Hussein notes a certain disillusionment in the face of the realities of life in
modern Muslim society, 1999, op. cit.. We ourselves have met young women who,
having gone Saudi Arabia with their husbands, did not wish to remain there.
57. We have been able to have very open discussions with ahong who had returned
from Iran or from Damascus, whereas they have felt a much more closed off and rigid
attitude on the part of ahong who had studied at Medina, and who, for example, avoid
looking an unveiled woman in the face when they speak to her.
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58. For example in Zhengzhou (Henan), a kindergarten has been opened in the mosque
on Huayuan Street. It is attended by 100 children, of whom 80 are Hui. Likewise, the
mosque on Maohuo Street in Zhaodong (Yunnan) has opened a kindergarten in
buildings it leases from the Catholic church opposite the mosque.
59. The subjects taught are classical and modern Chinese, foreign literature, philosophy
and pedagogy.
60. Dru Gladney, “The Salafiyya Movement in Northwest China: Fundamentalism
among the Muslim Chinese?”, in Leif Manger ed., Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in
Global Contexts, Surrey, Curzon Press, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, No. 26, 1999,
pp. 102-149.
61. Lipman Jonathan N., “Sufism in the Chinese Courts: Islam and Qing Law in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries”, in F. De Jong and B. Radtke eds., Islamic
Mysticism Contested. Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, Brill, 1999, pp.
553-575; Cherif-Chebbi, Leila, “L’Yihewani, une machine de guerre contre le soufisme
en Chine?” in F. DeJong and B. Radtke eds., ibidem, 1999, pp. 576-602. 
62. The salafi take into consideration only the Koran and those Hadith which are
considered to be authentic, and reject the schools of law which have grown up in
Sunnism. It is common to hear young halifa say with a certain admiration: “They know
the texts better!”.
63. We have observed this phenomenon in Yunnan.
64. On can still find, but only very rarely and very discreetly, translations of Mohamed
Abduh in Chinese, as well as, in Xinjiang, texts by Maududi, but in Urdu.
65. Zhongguo musilin, 2001, No. 3, p. 8.
66. The complete definition of the tasks of this committee is presented in Zhongguo
musilin, No. 3, 2001, p. 14.
67.Xinbian “wo er zi” (wa’z in Arabic) yanjiangti (New Compilation of Speeches for
Sermons), Peking, Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 2001, 136 pp. 
68. South China Morning Post, September 20th 2002. 
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